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Global Companies and Global Society
The Evolving Social Contract
Ann Florini
Introduction
The for-proﬁt sector has always found it necessary to operate under some type of
contract with society, whether implicit or explicit, and that social contract is always
contested and under negotiation. Companies often have negative as well as positive
impacts on the societies in which they are embedded, such as pollution, extraction
of rents, or treatment of labor, and societies differ across space and time in their
tolerance for those negative externalities. Moreover, business rarely thrives in a
society that lacks certain public goods, such as a ﬁnancial system to make cash and
credit available, a legal system to ensure contracts are honored, and usually some
sort of regulatory system. The costs for the provision of those public goods are
borne at least in part by people who are not directly sharing the proﬁts, and their
willingness to bear those costs depends in part on their acceptance of the legitimacy
of the private sector. As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (2000) show in their
magisterial survey of the history of business regulation through the ages, much of the
story of economic history is a story of the ever-changing nature of the social contract
for business.
The social contract is complex enough when the “social” side is well-deﬁned
and circumscribed, as in a national polity that has a government that can at least
in principle represent the interests of society and serve as a societal check on the
power of business (even if government does not always actually do so). But the era
of global economic integration has raised questions about whether national govern-
ments, either acting individually or attempting to cooperate with other governments,
retain that capacity (Alexandroff 2008; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Held and
McGrew 2002; Jones, Pascual, and Stedman 2009; Ruggie 1993; Slaughter 2004).
Such doubts have fostered efforts by a wide range of other social actors to ﬁnd
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ways to regulate and shape the roles of business, and their efforts are increasingly
facilitated by the information and communications revolution. Although clearly the
global sphere does not have the relatively well deﬁned society that exists at the
national level, where at least most residents usually share the common deﬁnition of
“citizen,” it is reasonable to argue that there has been some degree of development
of what might be called “global society” (Scholte 2005). This article explores the
relationship between global companies and the nascent global society through the
lens of the evolving social contract for global business.
When the current incarnation of economic globalization got underway in the
1960s and 1970s, it largely consisted of American corporations going overseas.
Thus, the social contract under which US business then operated was the mental
model available for those increasingly global companies. Within the United States,
the traditional division of labor among the three sectors – private (business), public
(government), and civil society – was assumed to be clear-cut. Business, usually in
the form of corporations, would seek proﬁts, and in so doing would provide wealth,
jobs, goods, and services to society. Governments would regulate those corporations
and would provide the public goods needed for society and business to ﬂourish,
including such public goods as contract enforcement, rules of the road, and property
rights. Civil society groups would agitate for change in government regulations and
attempt to broaden the deﬁnition of public goods that should be provided. Certainly
there were disputes about the extent of corporate social responsibility, as we will see
below, but in general these assumptions about the appropriate roles for the three
sectors prevailed.
Globalization, privatization, and changing ideas about the roles of business and
government have blurred these distinctions. In this new world, corporations increas-
ingly deliver essential services and meet basic public needs in their areas of operation
(and sometimes beyond), exert heavy inﬂuence over public policy, and ﬁnd that their
consumers and investors hold them directly accountable for their effects on the envi-
ronment and on human rights. Intergovernmental organizations and transnational
civil society networks demand to partner with global companies in pursuit of various
deﬁnitions of the public interest. The notion of the social contract for business has
always been contested, but now more hotly than ever. What now are the terms of the
implicit “social contract” between business operating at a global scale, and society?
Before we turn to that question, some deﬁnitional caveats are needed. First,
“global business” is not a well-deﬁned concept. It includes both Western and the
smaller but rapidly growing category of transnational non-Western-based ﬁrms,
particularly those based in Asia. Within each category, further subdivision is needed
according to the nature of the transnational ties of a given ﬁrm, whether those ties
primarily involve sales and trade, supply chains, or major operations abroad (par-
ticularly for extractive industries). Different elements of the social contract may be
more or less relevant for different types of global companies.
“Global society” has even less coherence as a concept. At the global level, there
are two “societies” to consider. One is the society of states, which we will consider
in its most organized form, the intergovernmental organization (IGO). The other is
global civil society. Clearly, there is no single demarcated set of nongovernmental
social ties that cross borders in ways that inﬂuence corporate licenses to operate. But
a reasonably close approximation, for the purposes of this chapter, can be found
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in the NGO sector, via both formally constituted international NGOs (INGOs) and
networks that bring together national and local civil society groups across borders
in less formal ways. Global ﬁrms must interact with both IGOs and INGOs.
This chapter will begin by laying out the US roots of the always-contested nature of
the social contract for business and how some older ideas about that social contract
no longer make sense under conditions of globalization. It then assesses how and
why the social contract has evolved through the interaction of global business and
global society, with the latter conceptualized in two ways: transnational civil society
networks as an example of social forces, and IGOs as proxy for the society of
states. It concludes by exploring emerging questions that affect the social license to
operate, such as the growing contestation over varieties of capitalism, the natural
resource/environmental crisis, and new forms of social organization.
The American Models
Two publications from the same time in the United States point to the contested
nature of the social contract for business. The ﬁrst is a New York Times Magazine
article by Milton Friedman (1970) that admirably summarized his views that the
business of business is business – in other words, that the social contract requires
of business only that it seek proﬁts within the boundaries of the law. Friedman
contended that the sole obligation of corporate managers is to do what shareholders
want, which is assumed to be proﬁt maximization.1 Friedman also argued that the
“best interests” of corporations, and therefore corporate shareholders, is the sole
legitimate criterion for all managerial decision-making (beyond legal compliance).
Friedman did allow a bit of wiggle room for “hypocritical window dressing” thatmay
serve to attract employees and reduce sabotage, which implied that some thinking
about the social contract might be useful, and customers and employees received
passing mention as deserving some managerial responsibility – but since they are not
owners, it is not clear on what basis Friedman extended that responsibility to them.
Friedman’s argument included one key claim and one key omission. The claim
was a strong assertion that government will take care of externalities, collective
action problems, and public goods provision by taxing, spending, and regulating as
needed to serve the public interest. The omission was to ignore corporate incentives
and possibly disproportionate capacity to inﬂuence public policy, not least to free
themselves from regulations and to win the legal right to externalize costs onto the
rest of society. As we will see below, the claim, always questionable in a world of
imperfect government, became far more problematic with globalization. And the
omission became too glaring to ignore when massive multinational corporations
engaged directly with emerging or less-developed countries.
With the temporary triumph of the neoliberal revolution in the 1980s and 1990s,
such views began to be seen elsewhere in the world as representing an American
consensus. But it is important to remember that in the 1970s Friedman was writing
in response to a chorus of calls, including several by business leaders, for greater social
responsibility on the part of American corporations. At the same time that Friedman’s
article appeared, a distinguished group of American business and academic leaders
was coming to a very different conclusion about the nature of the social contract
for business.
338 GLOBAL COMPANIES AND SOCIETY
The Committee for Economic Development (CED), an American think-tank
founded in 1942 whose 200 trustees are business and academic leaders, had been
searching for a pragmatic middle ground between voices such as Friedman’s at one
extreme and calls for business to solve all of America’s problems on the other. In
1971, after an intensive process engaging a wide range of those trustees, the CED
issued its report on “Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations” (Committee
for Economic Development 1971). This report is worth citing at length, as it took a
much broader view of the social contract in ways that strikingly foreshadow current
debates:
Business functions by public consent, and its basic purpose is to serve constructively the
needs of society – to the satisfaction of society. Historically, business has discharged this
obligation mainly by supplying the needs and wants of people for goods and services,
by providing jobs and purchasing power, and by producing most of the wealth of the
nation . . . (Committee for Economic Development 1971: 11)
[However,] the sluggishness of social progress is engendering rising criticism of all major
institutions – government, schools, organized labor, the military, the church, as well as
business. In this context, the large business corporation is undergoing the most searching
public scrutiny since the 1930s about its role in American society . . . (p. 14, emphasis
in original)
Today it is clear that the terms of the contract between society and business are, in
fact, changing in substantial and important ways. Business is being asked to assume
broader responsibilities to society than ever before, and to serve a wider range of
human values. Business enterprises, in effect, are being asked to contribute more to the
quality of American life than just supplying quantities of goods and services. Inasmuch
as business exists to serve society, its future will depend on the quality of management’s
response to the changing expectations of the public . . . (p. 16)
The great growth of corporations in size, market power, and impact on society has
naturally brought with it a commensurate growth in responsibilities; in a democratic
society, power sooner or later begets equivalent accountability. (p. 21, emphasis in
original)
As the report went into details, it cited approvingly a wide range of ways in which
corporations could pursue “enlightened self-interest” via engagement in a broader
range of activities than a pure proﬁt focuswould entail, fromphilanthropy to capacity
building for government to internalization of environmental externalities. At one
point, it foreshadowed what has since come to be known as “social enterprise”:
business must recognize that the pursuit of proﬁt and the pursuit of social objectives
can usually be made complementary. From the standpoint of business, proﬁt can be
earned by serving public needs for social improvements as well as for goods consumed
privately . . . There are likely to be many areas of social improvement in which the
prospects for proﬁt do not meet prevailing corporate investment criteria. In such cases,
corporations will need to reexamine the traditional concepts and measurements of proﬁt
in the newer context. This may well involve, among other things, a substantial diversion
of resources away from private consumption into higher priority social improvements.
(Committee for Economic Development 1971: 31–32)
As the consensus document makes clear, even within the United States views
within the business and academic communities about the nature of the social
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contract for business have long been far more varied and nuanced than the simplistic
slogan “the business of business is business” would suggest. This greater sophistica-
tion of views can also be found in US government policy and its role in protecting
citizens from the untrammeled functioning of market forces. In that regard, another
important precursor of current debates can be found in the academic literature of the
early 1980s. In an article well known to all graduate students of international rela-
tions, John Ruggie (1983) introduced the notion of “embedded liberalism.” Ruggie
suggested that the post-World War II American-led liberal economic order differed
fundamentally from its British predecessor. British liberalism was based on a widely
shared norm that the purpose of state monetary policy should only be to maintain
external stability via gold parity. In the 1920s and 1930s, that norm was breaking
down, with the result that the design of the post-war economic order reﬂected a
fundamentally different view of the appropriate role of state economic policy. The
Bretton Woods, American-led version of the liberal order extended legitimacy to the
notion of state economic intervention in pursuit of purely domestic goals such as full
employment and domestic social stability (pp. 208, 215). This signiﬁcant norm shift
embodied the notion that citizens should not be vulnerable to international economic
forces beyond their control and that governments should and could intervene to pro-
tect them. As we will see below, such thinking about the appropriate relationship
between markets and societies has transferred into debates about global markets and
global societies, featuring particularly in the United Nations’ efforts to promote an
improved global social contract for business.
The Globalization of Business and Society
The story of the globalization of business and the rise of global companies is well
described elsewhere in this Handbook. A quick review of the statistics shows a rapid
rise in the sheer numbers of transnational corporations with foreign afﬁliates. From
some 35,000 parent transnational corporations with about 170,000 foreign afﬁliates
at the beginning of the 1990s, the number jumped to 103,786 parents with 892,114
afﬁliates as of 2010 (UNCTAD 1992: 5; 2011). As global companies burgeoned and
took on more direct roles in international governance, scholars began exploring in
depth the emergence of what was termed “private authority” in the international
system (Cutler, Hauﬂer, and Porter 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Buthe 2010).
This literature generally addresses issues of business self-regulation.
It is less well known that the same trends of ever-cheaper transportation and com-
munications technologies, along with the great opening up of the former Soviet bloc,
China, and India, that have propeled the globalization of business have had simi-
lar if harder to measure impacts on global social ties. The impact of both formally
constituted international NGOs (INGOs) and less formal transnational networks of
civil society actors on international affairs became so pronounced that the 1990s saw
the rise of a cottage industry of scholarly publications documenting such impacts in
ﬁelds ranging from arms control to corruption to environmental protection (Keck
and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Florini
2000; Gordenker and Weiss 1996; Kaldor 2003; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink
2002; O’Brien et al. 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995; Smith, Chatﬁeld, and Pagnucco
1997; Weiss and Gordenker 1996). For the most part, this literature focuses on
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interactions between transnational civil society networks and governments, IGOs,
or international regimes, rather than global companies. A few signiﬁcant interna-
tional relations works have looked explicitly at the roles of global companies in
setting international rules (Sell 2003; Strange 1996). The management and interna-
tional business literature has also included signiﬁcant attention to the interaction
between businesses and NGOs, including some at the global level. A comprehensive
survey of this literature argues that it can be divided among six principle themes:
NGO activism; NGO–business partnerships; multi-sectoral partnerships; global gov-
ernance and standardization; national-level governance; and company stakeholder
management (Kourula and Laasonen 2010). Although many of these works from
all of these disciplines address questions of governance, power, authority, and legit-
imacy, surprisingly few have explicitly addressed the question of the existing and
evolving social contract under which global companies may operate.
The Evolution of the Global Social Contract
As a result of global economic and social integration, more and more of the business–
society interaction has played out at a transnational rather than purely national level,
involving transnational corporations, transnational civil society networks and orga-
nizations, and intergovernmental organizations. There is no simple way to categorize
these interactions. As MacIntosh and Thomas (2002) point out, the NGOs that inter-
act with business vary in their fundamental characteristics: their scope (from the very
local to the global), the nature of the organization (from community group to busi-
ness association to professional body), their structure, their focus (which can be
virtually any topic, from service delivery to human rights to environmental protec-
tion), their activities, and their choices about how to engage with corporations and
with IGOs. Thus, business-NGO interactions, unsurprisingly, can vary enormously.
The most visible of the interactions between global companies and global society
have occurred in the form of NGO campaigns against individual businesses and
against whole corporate sectors. Such campaigns are certainly not new – they date
back at least to the late 1700s, when opponents of slavery in such organizations as the
US-based Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and the British
Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade joined forces across the ocean,
exchanging information and sharing tactics aimed at mobilizing popular pressure
for antislavery legislation (Florini 2000). Starting in the 1970s and accelerating
in ensuing decades, however, has been a trend toward much more transnational
mobilization in such campaigns. As Spar and La Mure (2003) note, this is not
surprising given the shift in power from states to corporations:
In the earliest days of NGO activity, protestors targeted the obvious source of power: if
they wanted to end slavery or child labor, for example, they pressured the governments
that presided over, or at least permitted, such practices . . . However, as corporations
have gained prominence in the global economy, they have become more and more
the direct target of activism – of boycotts, consumer protest, and shareholder rebel-
lion . . . These strategies make eminent sense. In places like Burma, Indonesia, and
Sierra Leone, corporations such as The Gap or DeBeers can wield a disproportionate
amount of economic inﬂuence, an inﬂuence made even larger in recent years by the
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relative decline of both foreign aid and ofﬁcial lending. If economic inﬂuence can be
translated into political pull, then the best way to change a country’s laws or practice
may well be through the corporations that invest there. (pp. 80, 81)
Such campaigns can have signiﬁcant impact. Among the best known is the campaign
that arose in protest of implementation of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) regime in the late 1990s. The TRIPS accord, negotiated at the behest
of, and largely incorporating the terms preferred by, a number of large multinational
corporations, particularly pharmaceuticals, stirred a ﬁrestorm of controversy when
its stringent protections of intellectual property rights came into conﬂict with the
needs of many countries for less expensive versions of patent-protected medicines
to address such compelling medical emergencies as HIV/AIDS (Sell 2003). In what
may be one of the most glaring public relations blunders of modern times, dozens of
international drug companies ﬁled suit in 1997 to prevent South African president
Nelson Mandela from enforcing a law that would sidestep TRIPS protections for
HIV/AIDS medicines. Suing Nelson Mandela in pursuit of greater proﬁts and at the
expense of dying poor people did not go over well in the court of global public
opinion. After a global campaign involving Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, Oxfam Inter-
national, and many others, the global pharmaceutical corporations reversed course,
dropping the lawsuit and joining a number of efforts to make medicines affordable
in developing countries (Florini 2005).
Yet as Spar and La Mure (2003) demonstrate, in most cases the measurable
ﬁnancial threat from NGO activism is not at all clear to ﬁrms, yet nonetheless under
some conditions the campaigns have considerable impact in changing the behavior of
global business, while in others the campaigns seem not to matter much. When Nike,
for example, faced activist and media pressures related to working conditions in the
overseas factories that supplied it in the 1990s, it initially resisted calls for action,
insisting it had no responsibility for those conditions. By 1998, however, the ﬁrm
capitulated, and over the next few years became an active leader of efforts to improve
working conditions in the apparel industry around the world. Swiss pharmaceutical
giant Novartis, although it was not a producer of AIDS treatments and had not
been targeted in the TRIPS campaign described above or in other signiﬁcant NGO
campaigns, nonetheless began a dialogue with NGOs and established a corporate
social responsibility program, and launched a number of philanthropic ventures
related to health in developing countries. The oil ﬁrm Unocal, in contrast, fended
off years of intensive criticisms of its involvement in the Udana natural gas ﬁeld
in Burma, a country that only recently has begun to emerge from a status as an
international pariah for its brutal record on human rights.
Spar and La Mure (2003) suggest that ﬁrms consider three variables in deciding
how to respond when they are targeted: transaction costs, brand input, and com-
petitive position (p. 84). Unocal faced high transactions costs for withdrawing from
Burma, whereas Nike could relatively easily switch to other suppliers. Branding con-
cerns did not apply to Unocal, which had divested its retail gas stations, whereas Nike
was entirely dependent on retail consumer willingness to buy its products. Firms may
seek to improve their competitive position in their industry by moving early to align
themselves with NGO demands, as Novartis sought to differentiate itself from the
rest of the pharmaceutical industry, then under widespread attack. But as Spar and
342 GLOBAL COMPANIES AND SOCIETY
La Mure concede, not all can be explained by such commercial calculations. Even
among large publicly traded corporations, there is a role for the personal convictions
of top managers, who may choose to “do good” for its own sake.
Zadek (2006; 2010) describes corporations as moving through several stages of
organizational learning as they ﬁnd themselves pushed by global society to take on
new forms of corporate responsibility thinking. Global companies often begin with
a defensive response contesting the notion of any such responsibility or any implied
wrongdoing. They then move to a “compliance” stage of going along with certain
demands, such as signing up to codes of conduct. As corporations internalize new
ways of thinking, management practices change, and ultimately “social responsibil-
ity” steps may become part of corporate strategy. For a few, but only a few, such
social responsibility goals may become the primary purpose of the corporation.
On the other side of the corporate–NGO relationship, there has been a strong and
growing trend among NGOs to look for ways to partner with corporations – some-
times at the same time as campaigning against them. Most strikingly, Greenpeace,
better known for its spectacular stunts than for broad dialogue, took to joining
meetings with corporate and governmental leaders on such key environmental issues
as climate change. A 2012 New York Times account began as follows:
The bearded South African in the red dashiki took a seat in the front row amid a
sea of dark-suited executives at a side meeting of the United National climate change
conference [in Durban, South Africa] in December [2011]. “Kumi, it’s good to see
you here,” Bjorn Stigson, president of the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development, told Kumi Naido, executive director of Greenpeace International. “I’d
much rather have you inside the room here than outside protesting.” At that moment,
a group of Greenpeace activists under Mr. Naidoo’s direction were outside the hotel
picketing the business gathering. Seven were arrested and charged with trespassing;
three were ﬁned and deported. (Broder 2012)
On the part of both global companies and global society, there has been a demonstra-
ble, if far from universal and often hotly contested, evolution toward a willingness to
partner in the pursuit of social goals. Austin (2000) provides a helpful categorization
of how such partnerships may evolve, as viewed in relatively conventional business
terms. Often relationships between companies and NGOs begin as simple philan-
thropy, generally characterized by low engagement on the part of the ﬁrm, with
the philanthropy not central to the business mission, few resources invested, infre-
quent interaction between the business executives and the social groups, all of which
adds up to a low-cost and low-beneﬁt relationship for the ﬁrm. As the relationship
develops, it may become more transactional, with the ﬁrm gaining more beneﬁts,
possibly in the form of publicity and community goodwill. Finally, a meaningful and
longer-lasting integrative partnership could bring about joint value creation. How-
ever, as Austin noted in 2000, the “marketplace” for such alliances was then poorly
developed, with a serious shortage of information about potential partners and few
mechanisms for ﬁnding them.
Although the marketplace remains underdeveloped, signiﬁcant progress has
occurred since Austin wrote. One milestone was the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, which became known as
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the “Partnership Summit” for the large number of partnerships agreed among com-
panies, governments, and NGOs (Cowe 2004). Such undertakings as the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative got their start at Johannesburg, and many global
companies and NGOs took their ﬁrst steps toward new collaborations.
Global Companies and the Society of States: The Evolving Relationship
with IGOs
The relationship between market forces more broadly and companies speciﬁcally and
intergovernmental organizations dates back at least a century, to the founding of the
International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO’s tripartite membership, unique
among international organizations, brought together employers, governments, and
labor unions as equal partners in setting labor standards – the West’s attempt after
Russia’s Bolshevik revolution to ensure the future of capitalism. Thereafter, how-
ever, little happened on the IGO front for many decades.2 In the 1970s, a series
of scandals involving American multinational corporations operating in develop-
ing countries, such as ITT’s interference in Chile’s domestic elections (United States
Senate 1975), triggered pushback from those developing countries via the intergov-
ernmental organizations in which they had recently acquired majority voting power.
Most signiﬁcantly, the United Nations set up a Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions and began negotiations aimed at developing standards to require corporations
to respect national sovereignty and to disclose information about their operations
(Hauﬂer 2001: 16).
With the Reagan–Thatcher “neoliberal revolution” of the 1980s, however, the
impetus for regulating transnational business via IGOs faltered. Driven partly by
technology and partly by normative shifts, developing countries began to welcome
the foreign investment and skills of global companies (Martin 1999; Yergin and
Stanislaw 1998). Yet the “anti-globalization” protests of the 1990s sparked renewed
concerns about the social contract within which global companies were operating
(Florini 2003).
In response to such concerns, the United Nations returned to Ruggie’s idea of
“embedded liberalism” to consider how economic liberalism could be re-embedded
in the increasingly integrated global economy.3 In 1999, UN Secretary General Koﬁ
Annan gave a speech to the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting in Davos,
Switzerland, an ideal site for reaching corporate leaders as the WEF’s membership
includes the world’s thousand largest corporations. In it, he pleaded for what he
called a global compact, essentially a new social contract “of shared values and
principles, which will give a human face to the global market”:
Globalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility. The
problem is this. The spread of markets outpaces the abilities of societies and their
political systems to adjust to them, let alone to guide the course they take. History
teaches us that such an imbalance between the economic, social and political worlds
can never be sustained for very long . . .
Let us remember that the global markets and the multilateral trading system we have
today did not come about by accident. They are the result of enlightened policy choices
made by governments since 1945. If we want to maintain them in the new century,
344 GLOBAL COMPANIES AND SOCIETY
all of us – governments, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, international
organizations – have to make the right choices now.
We have to choose between a global market driven by calculations of short-term
proﬁt, and one which has a human face. Between a world which condemns a quarter
of the human race to starvation and squalor, and one which offers everyone at least a
chance of prosperity, in a healthy environment. Between a selﬁsh free-for-all in which
we ignore the fate of the losers, and a future in which the strong and the successful
accept their responsibilities, showing global vision and leadership. I am sure you will
make the right choice.
The outcome of that stirring call to arms was strikingly different from the UN’s
previous venture into restructuring the social contract for business via the Center for
Transnational Corporations. This time, the UN set up an entirely voluntary “Global
Compact,” a code of conduct with a difference. The Global Compact does not set
speciﬁc standards for member companies to attain. Instead, it lays out ten princi-
ples in the arenas of human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and
anti-corruption, based on international agreements widely adopted by the world’s
governments. Member companies are required to report annually on their efforts to
align their practices with those principles. The reporting requirement and discussions
among the member companies and other Global Compact adherents (civil society
groups and UN agencies) are intended to help the member companies learn how to
make progress toward what is essentially global social contract.
In short, the Global Compact aims to re-embed liberal market functions on a
voluntary basis in a social contract based on principles legitimized by governments
for other purposes. It demonstrates clearly the shift in UN attitudes regarding global
companies to one that seeks engagement (Therien and Pouliot 2006). Its efﬁcacy in
changing business practices is hotly disputed. Although it regularly expels member
companies that fail to comply with its reporting requirements or for failing to report
substantive progress toward the goals (it expelled its 3000th member company in
February 2012), thus ensuring that the Compact is not merely a ﬁg leaf, it is not
designed to verify the companies’ self-reported accomplishments. That leaves civil
society activists skeptical about whether the terms of this new social contract are in
fact being honored (Marx 2012).
Although it is the most ambitious attempt to date to design a social compact
appropriate for the global era, the Global Compact is only one of many interactions
between global companies and IGOs. As Bull, Boas, and McNeill (2004) show, the
Global Compact is just one of multiple forms of cooperation underway between
IGOs, particularly the United Nations, and global companies. These include policy
dialogue (such as corporate participation in the UNAIDS governing board), advocacy
partnerships (such as the NetAid initiative that brought together the UN Develop-
ment Program and Cisco), information and learning partnerships (such as the Global
Compact), and direct engagement in operations (such as the Refugee Registration
Project of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Microsoft).4
This growing engagement results from multiple factors. One is clearly simple
need for resources – cash-strapped IGOs have gone in search of funds and in-kind
contributions. But the growing degree of partnership between global companies and
IGOs could not have happened with the UN of the 1970s. Clearly, there has been an
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ideological shift within the UN’s membership, from neo-Marxist to neoliberal, that
has included awillingness to engagewith global companies in lieu of trying to regulate
them. Here, a crucial factor has been the practical and intellectual leadership of
particular individuals, notably former Secretary General Koﬁ Annan, senior ofﬁcials
such as Mark Malloch Brown, John Ruggie, and UN Global Compact head Georg
Kell, along with leaders in other IGOs such as Gro Harlem Brundtland at the World
Health Organization. On the part of global companies, issue speciﬁc factors have
impelled greater interest in collaborating with IGOs, such as the growing prevalence
of HIV/AIDS among labor forces (Bull, Boas, and McNeill 2004).
Assessments of the implications of greater private-sector involvement with UN
organization have been mixed. On the positive side, as Bull, Boas, and McNeill
(2004) suggest, the partnerships bring greater ﬂexibility and relevance to IGOs, in
addition to resources. But these are instrumental considerations. Critics raise con-
cerns about the explosion of public-private “funds,” particularly in the health arena,
that may challenge efforts to create more coherent programs. The Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), for example, has been criticized for focusing
on vaccinating children – a particular concern of funder Bill Gates – at the expense
of building robust and sustainable health systems with trained personnel able to
respond to local priorities. Corporate involvement may also distort policy priorities,
with the particular engagement of large pharmaceutical corporations following the
TRIPS debacle a possible explanation of why there have been so many fragmented
health initiatives. Partnerships between IGOs and global companies may also shift
the balance of power among UN agencies in favor of those agencies whose mandates
or operations happen to be of greatest corporate interest.
Many in transnational civil society remain suspicious of the relationship between
global business and IGOs (and their most inﬂuential member states), seeing these
relationships as means by which business shapes global rules to its own beneﬁt
in what is in effect privatization of the multilateral system. In 2006, for example,
ActionAid, an international non-governmental federation of development organi-
zations, released a report arguing that “[b]ig business’s privileged access to policy-
makers is contributing to global trade rules that undermine the ﬁght against poverty”
(p. 4). ActionAid (2006: 10) contended that in addition to common indirect means
of inﬂuence on policy-makers such as ﬁnancial contributions, media coverage, and
wining and dining of policy-makers, global companies also have disproportionate
inﬂuence on trade policy via such direct means as:
 face to face meetings with policy-makers;
 serving on government advisory committees;
 making presentations to policy-makers;
 sending letters, memos and emails to policy-makers;
 making formal submissions to government consultations;
 even serving on government delegations.
ActionAid argued that the outcome of such disproportionate corporate inﬂuence can
be seen in such global trade rules as TRIPS and the Global Agreement on Trade in
Services, which it contends have beneﬁtted global companies at the expense of the
global public interest.
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Bull, Boas, and McNeill (2004), however, note that inﬂuence may be a two-way
street. Although advocates for corporate–IGO partnerships usually focus on instru-
mental questions of efﬁciency and effective operations, and critics are concerned
with the impact on the power, authority, and legitimacy of IGOs, Bull, Boas, and
McNeill have a constructivist take, pointing out the potential positive impact, with
IGOs becoming “an arena for encounters between different forces in which multi-
lateral institutions become nodal points in complex networks of governance, rather
than a system constituted mainly by state actors” (p. 493). The question of who
inﬂuences whom with regard to ideas and framing is an empirical one that should
be investigated, not asserted: “Authority and legitimacy are not ﬁxed but ﬂexible –
subject to changing, malleable interpretations over time” (p. 494).
Conclusion
The current state of the global social contract is rather messy. The former neat
distinction of the three sectors and their respective roles clearly no longer holds, and
the notion of a social contract that allows business to seek proﬁts by any legal means
is not tenable, particularly given the degree to which business is now setting the rules
that determine what is legal. But where does this leave us?
John Ruggie, who as both scholar and practitioner has played as large a role
as anyone in both analyzing and shaping the evolving social contract for global
companies, describes that evolution as follows. Ruggie’s assessment begins with
what he calls the accountability chapter, with attention to the accountability of
global ﬁrms to the wide range of stakeholders affected by corporate decisions and
actions. This chapter in the evolution of the global social contract includes the whole
array of codes, reporting initiatives, certiﬁcation schemes, and other proliferating
experiments in transparency and accountability, driven primarily byNGOs, although
with slowly increasing involvement from investors and governments – an important
story, but one that may have run its course in terms of impelling change. Chapter two,
in Ruggie’s view, is social capacity-building, where he locates the Global Compact
that he helped to establish, and which includes many of the operational partnerships
described above. Chapter three, where little progress has yet been made, concerns the
imbalance in the system of global rule-making, which “has increasingly privileged
private capital over other social actors, and the spread of global markets over other
social concerns – be they human rights, labor standards, or environmental principles”
(Ruggie et al. 2004: 14). Such an imbalance is not socially sustainable, and managing
these tensions would require ﬁnding ways to “marry world civic politics with global
private governance” (p. 14).
Ruggie may be correct that Chapter one-type initiatives are unlikely to cumulate
into adequate means of addressing the imbalances between global companies and
global society, but they are also unlikely to fade away. Codes of conduct, disclosure
standards, new business models, and investment standards are still largely experi-
mental and it is probably too early to dismiss them altogether. Yet it is certainly true
that they are piecemeal and uncoordinated efforts at best. Social capacity-building
is certainly needed, but it is not clear what that capacity will then be able to accom-
plish in the absence of a more coherent and cohesive global governance system within
which the social contract would apply. And it is certainly the case that a system of
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global rule-making that excessively privileges capital at the expense of societies is
not one likely to satisfy society’s concerns in the social contract.
Many questions remain to be addressed. One key question is: who will set the
terms of a new global social contract? As we have seen, multiple dialogues are
underway, both in the form of conversation and via the practice of partnerships, but
little research has yet been done on the implications of those dialogues. Despite Bull,
Boas, and McNeill’s intriguing suggestion of the power of IGOs to inﬂuence global
companies in the global public interest, little is yet known about which direction
inﬂuence actually ﬂows. Moreover, with the emergence of global companies from
countries not previously strongly represented in these debates, such as China and
India, the question of “who” will necessarily involve whole societies whose attitudes
toward such questions have yet to be rigorously investigated.
A second question is: what will drive the terms of the new social contract? The
global agenda of the next few decades is likely to be shaped by two very powerful
trends. The ﬁrst is what might be called the age of scarcity: the increasingly tight con-
straints on available water, arable land, climate “space,” and other natural resources
that previously were relatively available to global ﬁrms. On such key issues as climate,
biodiversity loss, the imbalances in the nitrogen cycle, and other severely threatening
global environmental threats, the utter failure of intergovernmental cooperation to
rise to the scale of the challenges is likely to spur social demands on global companies
to act – demands that current business models are ill designed to meet. The second
is inequality, given the socially stressful trends toward concentration of wealth and
income in most countries in an ever smaller elite, trends from which leaders of global
companies have beneﬁted. A stable social contract for business may entail quite
signiﬁcant changes in how rewards are allocated.
All this leaves us with a rich research agenda. In the growing array of partnerships,
who is actually inﬂuencing whom? Can these partnerships move beyond service
delivery to entail much deeper collaboration around the thorny issues on the global
agenda? Will varieties of capitalism engage in the debate over the social contract
in different ways, with shareholder-driven public companies responding differently
from privately held global companies, not to mention the impact of globally active
state-owned enterprises?
Even more important than these analytical puzzles is the basic normative question.
What is the right model for a social contract for global companies and global business
in the twenty-ﬁrst century? While answers to that question will undoubtedly vary
widely, the process of having the conversation is crucial. We must ﬁnd ways to foster
reasoned debate over a wide spectrum of actors. Without processes that can lead to
the development of such a social contract, global companies are unlikely to enjoy
the long-term stability that only such legitimacy can bring.
Notes
1 Among the many implicit assumptions of this argument is that most shareholders hold equities for a
sufﬁciently long time that their interests are reasonably aligned with the longer-term interests of other
stakeholders. In other words, Friedman does not consider the existence of shareholders who would be
satisﬁed with company plans that would create very short-term spikes in share prices but would drive
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the ﬁrm out of business shortly thereafter. In the era of hyperspeed traders, an era in which the average
holding of SU equities is well under one year, short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders
have very different interests, even deﬁned solely in narrow proﬁt terms. See Martin (2011).
2 The post-World War II Bretton Woods institutions were supposed to have a third partner, an Inter-
national Trade Organization that among other things would have protected cross-border business
investments and controlled restrictive business practices – but the US Congress refused to ratify the
treaty creating the ITO (Jenkins 2001: 1–2).
3 Ruggie at the time was serving as Assistant Secretary General, on leave from Columbia University.
4 Bull, Boas, and McNeill include mobilization of private funds in support of multilateral programs,
such as Ted Turner’s $1 billion gift to create the UN Foundation in support of UN-related goals, or
the Gates Foundation $750 million contribution to GAVI. However, these are gifts from individuals
or foundations, not companies per se, and thus are not included in my analysis of the relationship
between global companies and IGOs.
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